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WARRANTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES OF THE
PERSON WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR
PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION: THE NEW CONTOURS
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The cases' considered in this comment address the problem of substance
abuse and the efforts of United States policymakers to respond to this
crisis. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association and National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab both hold that warrantless and
suspicionless administrative searches are authorized as long as the government can 2show a special need for such a search beyond normal law
enforcement.
In Skinner, the United States Supreme Court approved the use of
warrantless and suspicionless mandatory searches, in the form of breath,
3
certain railway
blood, and urine tests, for all crew members involved in
4 or violating certain railway safety regulations. 5 The Court held
accidents
that the government's valid interest in preventing accidents and casualties
in rail operations resulting from drug or alcohol impaired crew members
involved. 6
outweighs the privacy interests of the railway employees
In Von Raab, decided the same day as Skinner, the Court approved
warrantless and suspicionless tests of Customs Service officials seeking
transfer or promotion to certain positions. These positions involve direct
participation in the interdiction of drugs, the enforcement of drug related
7
laws, or the carrying of a firearm. The Court did not extend the testing
program to employees involved in handling "classified material," as
requested by the Customs Service, because the Court found the8 definition
of "classified" to be inadequately defined in the regulation.
Considered together, these cases extend the allowable circumstances
under which warrantless and suspicionless searches may be conducted.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze these cases and their implications for traditional fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches. Additionally, some recent decisions applying Skinner and Von
Raab are reviewed for their implications for the future of public sector
drug testing in America. Finally, a suggestion is presented for state courts

1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
2. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)); Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 677.
3. 489 U.S. at 633-34.
4. See infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
6. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
7. Id.at 664-65.
8. Id.
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as an alternative to following the federal courts in a lock-step fashion.
II.

THE SKINNER CASE

A.

Background
The Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA" or "Agency"), 9 pursuant
to authority delegated to it by the Secretary of Transportation,0 determined that drug and alcohol abuse poses a serious threat to rail safety

in the United States." To counter this threat, the FRA promulgated
regulations mandating blood and urine tests for employees involved in
certain train accidents. 2 The regulations also permit, but do not require,
the testing of employees who violate certain safety regulations.3
While railroads have long prohibited on-duty use of alcohol by operating
employees, 4 this prohibition has recently been expanded to include use
or possession of certain drugs.' 5 These prohibitions are industry-wide,
and the usual sanction for violation is dismissal.16
Prior to proposing the current regulation in 1983, the FRA expressed
concern that the level of effort then expended to curtail drug and alcohol
abuse in the railroad industry was inadequate.' 7 To support its allegation
that more comprehensive efforts were needed, the FRA referenced a study
showing that on-the-job intoxication was a significant problem.' 8 The
Agency also referred to an internal review of accident reports for an
eleven year period showing that alcohol or other drugs were the cause
of or a contributing factor in at least twenty-one significant accidents
resulting in twenty-five fatalities, sixty-one injuries, and property damage
estimated at 19 million dollars. 9 The FRA also identified seventeen
additional fatalities of operating employees working on or around rolling
stock in which alcohol or other drugs were implicated as a cause or
contributing factor. 20 One instance, involving the release of hazardous
materials, resulted in the evacuation of an entire Louisiana community. 2'
9. The Federal Railroad Administration is an administrative agency within the Department of
Transportation charged with federal oversight of railroads in the United States. 45 U.S.C.A. § 431
(1986).
10. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. "The problem of alcohol abuse is as old as the industry itself." Id. Carrier rules aimed at
deterring alcohol use have been in existence for at least a century. Most rules prohibit operating
employees from possessing alcohol or being intoxicated while on duty and from consuming alcoholic
beverages while subject to being called for duty. More recently, these proscriptions have been
expanded to include the use or possession of certain drugs. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 607.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 607 n.l.
19. Id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 30,726 (1983)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 608 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 24,254, 24,259 (1984)).

WARRANTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES

Spring 19911

In spite of the extent of the problem, railroads were able to detect very
few violations of these policies, largely because of their reliance on
supervisors' and co-workers' observations as their primary means of
enforcement. 22 It was against this backdrop 23of abuse that the FRA sought
ways to combat on-duty substance abuse.
The Testing Program
In 1985, the FRA proposed the regulation which caused the controversy
25
in Skinner.2 The proposed regulation continued the ban on alcohol use
and established the ban on use or possession of controlled substances
26.
when on duty or subject to call for duty. Two subparts of the regulation
pertain to testing. Subpart C, entitled "Post-Accident Toxicological Testing," is mandatory, 27 while subpart D, "Authorization to Test for Cause,"
B.

is permissive.

2

Subpart C requires the taking of blood and urine samples from employees assigned to perform service subject to the Hours of Service Act
of 190729 for toxicological testing by the FRA following a major train
accident, 30 an impact accident, 3' or any train accident involving a fatality
32
to any on-duty railroad employee. Primary reliance is placed on analysis
of the blood samples as the only available body fluid that provides both
a clear indication of the presence of drugs and alcohol in the body and
33
an estimation of their impairment effects. However, urine samples also
are needed because drug traces remain in the urine longer than in the
obtain a blood sample
blood and circumstances may make it impossible to
34
bloodstream.
the
from
before a drug disappears
Subpart D authorizes, but does not require, railroads to force employees
within the designated categories to submit to breath or urine tests under
3
certain circumstances not covered by subpart C. 1 For instance, railroads
22. Id. at 607-08 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 24,266-24,267 (1984)).
23. Id. at 608.
24. Id.
25. 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1987).
26. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608-09 (citing C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(2) (1987)).
27. Id. at 609 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(a) (1987)).
28. Id. at 611 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301 (1987)).
29. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 61-66 (1986). The regulation provides a limited exception from testing in
cases where the railroad representative can immediately determine, on the basis of specific information,
that the employee had no role in causing the accident. The exception does not apply in the case
of a major train accident, in which case all employees covered by the Hours of Service Act of
1907 must be tested. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-10 n.2.
30. A major train accident is defined as "any train accident that involves (i) a fatality, (ii) the
release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage
to railroad property of $500,000." Id. at 609 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1987)).
31. An impact accident "is defined as a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage
to railroad property of $50,000 or more." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(2) (1987)).
32. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(3) (1987)).
33. Id. at 610 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 24,291 (1984)).
34. Id. (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 24,291 (1984)).
35. The railroad may order breath or urine tests or both: (1) after a reportable accident or
incident, where a supervisor has a "reasonable suspicion" that an employee's acts or omissions
contributed to the occurrence or severity of the accident or incident; or (2) in the event of certain
specific rule violations, including noncompliance with a signal and excessive speeding. Id. at 611
(citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.301(b)(2), 219.301(b)(3) (1987)).
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may require breath testing when a supervisor has a reasonable suspicion
that an employee is under the influence of alcohol, or both breath and
urine tests may be required when two supervisors make a determination
that the employee is under the influence of some chemical substance.3 6
Whenever the results of the breath or urine tests are intended for use
in disciplinary proceedings, the employee must be informed that he or
she has the right to provide a contemporaneous blood sample for analysis
at an independent medical facility. 7 If the employee fails to provide a
blood sample and the urine sample is positive, "the railroad-may presume
impairment absent persuasive evidence to the contrary.''38
C. ProceduralHistory
The Railway Labor Executives Association, joined by some of its
member labor organizations, brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California to enjoin the FRA regulations
on various statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted
summary judgment for the government, ruling that the railroad employees'
interests were outweighed by the competing public and governmental
interest in promoting railway safety.3 9
The Ninth Circuit reversed and invalidated the regulations. 40 The court
held that the authority conferred by the regulations involved sufficient
government action to implicate the fourth amendment and that the urine
tests it authorized were fourth amendment searches. 4 '
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that the circumstances and
competing interests of the parties permitted testing without first obtaining
a warrant or adhering to traditional probable cause standards. However,
in assessing the reasonableness of the search, the court concluded that
particularized suspicion is essential. 42 Only by requiring particularized
suspicion would the testing be limited to the detection of current impairment rather than the discovery of drug residues that remain in the
body for days or even weeks.4 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" to consider whether
the invalidated regulations constituted a violation of the fourth amendment.4 The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 6
36. If the supervisors suspect that the impairment is due to a drug other than alcohol, "at least
one of those supervisors must have received training in detecting the signs of drug intoxication."
Id.at 611 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(ii) (1987)).
37. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.303(c) (1987)).
38. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.307(b) (1987)).
39. Id. at 612.
40. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 583 (9th Cir. 1988).
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Metabolites of some drugs, such as cannabis, are stored in the fatty tissues of the body
and remain detectable for extended periods of time after the last use. The presence of such traces
in the urine of an individual has no direct bearing to the level of drug intoxication at the time of
the accident under investigation and would therefore be of questionable relevance. Id. at 588-89.
44. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
45. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613.
46. Id.
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The Supreme Court's Analysis

1. Preliminary Questions
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that Skinner presents
two preliminary questions: first, are the blood and urine tests in question
attributable to the government or its agents? Second, do these tests amount
amendment? 47
to searches or seizures within the meaning of the fourth
In deciding whether an accident investigator for the railroad should
be considered a government agent, the primary consideration4 is the degree
of government participation in the investigator's activities. The Court
decided that in this case, the government's degree of involvement was
substantial.4 9 The FRA regulations establishing the drug testing program
preempt state laws, rules, and regulations covering the same subject matter
50
and are designed to supersede collective bargaining agreements as well.
The regulations authorize the FRA to receive biological samples and test
results procured by the railroads." Further, a railroad may not divest
itself of the authority to perform the optional tests authorized by subpart
D, nor may a railroad compromise this authority by contract or other
means.5 2 An employee may not decline his employer's request to submit
in subpart D
to breath or urine tests under the conditions set forth
53
without risking being withdrawn from covered service. Based on these
factors, the Court found clear indications of governmental encouragement,
endorsement, and participation sufficient to implicate the fourth amend-

ment .

4

In analyzing the second preliminary question, the Court stated that
taking a blood sample is recognized as an infringement of a legitimate
privacy expectation and is deemed a fourth amendment search." Breath
testing, which is also authorized by the FRA regulation, is very similar
to blood testing in that it requires a "deep lung" breath and implicates
concerns for bodily integrity similar to those considered in Schmerber v.
5 6 Therefore, breath testing is also considered a fourth amendCalifornia.
57
ment search.
The collection of urine specimens, the third category of drug testing
authorized by the FRA regulation, requires no surgical intrusions into

47. Id. at 614.
48. Id. (citing Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (plurality opinion); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1927)).
49. Id. at 615.
50. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.13(a) (1987)).
51. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(c) (1987)).
52. Id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 31,552 (1985)).
53. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(b) (1987)).
54. Id. at 615-16.
55. Id. at 616 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
56. The Court's primary concern was the compelled intrusion into the body to obtain the
substance to be analyzed. 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
57. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)).
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the body.5 8 However, the test can reveal many facts about the donor
other than those related to drug use.5 9 Additionally, the fact that collection
of the sample may involve visual or aural monitoring of urination clearly
implicates privacy interests ° The Court concluded that collecting and
testing urine samples is an intrusion upon long recognized, reasonable
privacy expectations and, therefore, must be deemed a search under the
fourth amendment.6
2. The Warrant Requirement
The Court next focused on the standards to be used in determining
the appropriateness of the searches in question. 62 The fourth amendment
does not prohibit all searches and seizures; it only prohibits those that
are unreasonable. 63 The reasonableness of a search or seizure depends
upon the circumstances surrounding it and the nature of the search or
seizure itself." The determination in any given instance is made by
balancing the fourth amendment rights of the individual against legitimate
governmental interests advanced by the search or seizure. 65
In most cases, except for a few well-defined exceptions, a search or
seizure is unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant
issued upon probable cause." However, when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement" arise, the Court has been willing to
balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality
67
of the warrant and probable cause requirements.
The Court has recognized some notable exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirement." For example, the search of a probationer's
home for firearms was upheld in Griffin v. Wisconsin69 because of the
state's special need to supervise probationers. The search of an automobile
junkyard was upheld in New York v. Burger70 because of the diminished
expectation of privacy related to doing business in a highly regulated
industry. Work-related searches of public employees' desks and offices
were upheld in O'Connor v. Ortega71 because of the substantial govern-

58. Id. at 617.
59. For instance, the sample can be tested to reveal if the donor is epileptic, diabetic, or pregnant.

Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 619.
63. Id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768).
64. Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
65. This balancing of the governmental interest in searching against the individual's legitimate
right to and expectation of privacy has been the Court's modem approach to fourth amendment
problems. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
66. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978)).
67. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, (1987)).
68. Id.
69. 483 U.S. at 873.
70. 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987).
71. 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
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ment interest in the efficient operation of the workplace. The search of
a student's purse by a school's vice-principal was allowed in New Jersey
v. T.L. 0.72 because of the substantial interest of teachers and admin73
istrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.
74 the Court upheld body cavity searches
And, finally, in Bell v. Wolfish,
75
of inmates because of legitimate prison security interests.
7 6 in Skinner performed safety-sensitive
The employees subject to testing
tasks, namely operating trains or working around them. 77 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the government's interest in ensuring railroad safety
a departure from the usual
presented the requisite special needs justifying
78
warrant and probable cause requirements.
Additionally, the testing program was characterized by the Court as
administrative, rather than criminal, in nature. 79 In most criminal cases,
a search or seizure is deemed reasonable only if conducted pursuant to
8
a judicial warrant issued by an impartial magistrate upon probable cause.
The purpose of the data uncovered by the tests in Skinner is the promotion
of rail safety, not the prosecution of the employee tested. 81 This distinction
is important because there has been a trend during the past twenty years
toward permitting greater leeway in administrative searches, often referred
to as "inspections" or "regulatory searches. "82
The Court first clearly articulated the standard for an administrative
search in Camara v. Municipal Court.83 Camara concerned the conviction
of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector to
enter and inspect his premises without a search warrant.Y The Court
held that the valid public interest justifying the need to conduct an
administrative search must be balanced against the individual's expectation
85
of being free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy.
The Court listed several factors it considers in performing this balancing
test: (1) the history of judicial and public acceptance of the practice in
question;8 6 (2) the existence of a less intrusive method; and (3) whether
such as a
the practice involves a relatively limited invasion of privacy,
87
crime.
a
of
evidence
for
search
a
building inspection, or

72. 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
73. Id. at 339.
74. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 560-62.
See supra notes 29-32, 35-36 and accompanying text.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
Id.
Id.at 621 n.5.
Id. at 621-22.
Id.at 620-21 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) (1987)).

82. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMMNA
83. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
84. Id. at 525.

85. Id. at 539.
86. Id. at 537.
87. Id.

PROCEDURE 187 (1985).
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At issue in Camara was a building inspection aimed at finding safety
and building code violations.88 The Court concluded that administrative
inspections of the kind here involved, while less intrusive than a typical
search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime, still fell within the
scope of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable government
searches. 89 To decide otherwise would have the effect of providing such
protection only to individuals suspected of a crime.9° The Court also
concluded that although a warrant was needed to conduct the type of
housing inspection in question, 9' the probable cause needed for such a
warrant to issue could be found in the legislative or administrative
standards of the act authorizing the inspection. 92 The issuance of the
proper warrant need not depend upon an inspector's specific knowledge
of the condition of the particular dwelling.93
In Skinner, the Court reasoned that the primary purpose of the warrant
requirement is to protect privacy interests by ensuring such intrusions
are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents. 94 A warrant
provides both the proof that the search is authorized and a statement
of its specific scope and objectives. A warrant also provides oversight
by an impartial magistrate to ensure that the intrusion is justified. 95
The Court found that a warrant in the Skinner case would do little
more to achieve these purposes.96 The reasons for testing and the permissible limits of the tests themselves were clearly and specifically defined
in the regulations authorizing them. Only minimal discretion was vested
in the individuals charged with administering the program and there were
virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.97
Additionally, the Court recognized that the government's interest in
searching without a warrant is often most urgent when the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search. 98 Although the metabolites of some drugs remain detectable
in urine for considerable periods of time, 99 the samples must be collected
as soon as possible after the accident, safety rule violation, or other
triggering event to enable the FRA to determine whether the employee
was impaired at the time of the accident or violation, as opposed to
determining whether the employee was using drugs during the days preceding the test.100 In this respect the delay involved in obtaining a warrant
could result in a loss of evidence.' 0'

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 623 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court also considered the fact that sample collection was to be
carried out by railroad employees, primarily supervisors.3 2 These individuals were not experienced in matters relating to law enforcement and
possessed little or no experience with the intricacies of warrant procedures.
The Court therefore found it unreasonable to impose the burden of
complying with warrant procedures upon these supervisors. 03 Based on
a combination of the above factors, the Court concluded that a warrant
was not required to render the tests reasonable under the fourth amendment.,04
3. The Requirement of Individualized Suspicion
Normally, even a search that may be conducted without a warrant
must still be based upon probable cause.°5 In some cases where the Court
has found that the "balance of interests" precludes a showing of probable
cause, it has nonetheless required some quantum of individual suspicion
before concluding that a search is reasonable. °6 However, the Court has
concluded that individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor below
which a search must be presumed unreasonable.107 If the balancing test
shows that privacy interests are minimal, governmental interests are important, and governmental interests are frustrated by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, the search may be reasonable even in the absence
of specific suspicion. The Court in Skinner found these conditions to be
present and concluded that the drug testing searches are reasonable even
absent individualized suspicion.° 8
The opinion in Skinner was based upon several factors: (1) an employee's movement is already restricted as a normal part of being at
work;3 9 (2) the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is "not significant";' °
(3) breath tests are less intrusive than blood tests and implicate no
significant privacy concerns;'" and (4) although urine tests do implicate
significant privacy concerns," 2 the regulations endeavor to reduce the
intrusiveness of the collection process." 3 The Court upheld the regulations
in question, concluding that the testing procedures pose only limited

102. Id.
103. Id. at 623-24.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
107. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 624-25.
110. The Court reasoned that blood tests are a commonplace experience, a normal part of a
routine physical examination. The quantity of blood taken is minimal and for most people "the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Id. at 625 (citing Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
I1l. Id. at 625-26.
112. Id.at 626.
113. The regulations do not require that samples be furnished under the direct observation of a
monitor. In addition, the sample is collected in a medical environment by personnel unrelated to
the railroad employer. Finally, the privacy expectations of covered employees are reduced by their
participation in an industry that is heavily regulated to ensure safety. Id. at 626-27.
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threats to the privacy expectations of the covered employees, and that,
by contrast, the governmental interests in testing without a showing of
individualized suspicion are compelling. 114 These compelling interests include: (1) the importance of preventing rail accidents caused by drug or
alcohol impairment; (2) deterring covered employees from using drugs
or alcohol on duty; and (3) providing the rail industry with information
regarding the cause of major rail accidents.'
The decision in Skinner significantly expands the special needs exception
to the fourth amendment by extending the acceptable categories of searches6
conducted without probable cause to include those aimed at the person."
The Skinner decision also abolishes the existence of individualized suspicion as a prerequisite for approval under a special needs analysis" 7 and
clears the way for wide-spread use of drug testing in the public sector."'
E.

Dissent

1. Major Concerns
Justice Marshall authored the dissent, in which Justice Brennan joined." 9
The dissent is premised on a fear that the majority's interpretation is a
significant step toward reading the probable cause requirement out of
the fourth amendment. 20 In support of this assertion, the dissent points
out that the Court has "permitted 'special needs' to displace constitutional
text in each of the four categories of searches enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment: searches of 'persons, ' 21 'houses, ' 2 'papers,1 23 and 'effects.,",2
The dissenters argue that previously the Court relaxed the probable
cause standard only when the government action had a substantially less
intrusive impact on privacy than a full scale search. 25 Even in cases
which dispensed with the probable cause requirement, the government
was almost always required to show individualized suspicion to justify
the search.1'6 The decision in Skinner widens the special needs exception
27
to permit testing without probable cause or particularized suspicion.

114. Id. at 628.
115. Id. at 628-30.
116. Id. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 655.
119. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and with the majority position with the exception
of the portion of the Court's opinion that relies on a rationale of deterrence. Justice Stevens
reasoned that if the threat of death or injury in a major rail accident was not sufficient to deter
the use of drugs, the fear of apprehension by a drug test would not be more likely to do so. Id.
at 671 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
120. Id. at 636 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
123. Id. at 636-37 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega,- 480 U.S. 709 (1987)).
124. Id. at 637 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
125. Id. at 638 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 640.
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was limited to searches
Prior to this decision, the special needs exception
28
involving property rather than persons.
The dissenters' objections to the Skinner decision centered on the
expansion of the exceptions to fourth amendment protections. 29 The
elimination of the probable cause requirement, the elimination of the
particularized suspicion requirement, and the expansion of the exception
to searches of the person all tend to blur the outer boundary of what
protection yet remains under the fourth amendment. 3 0
2. Dissent's Analysis of the Case
Using an analysis similar to that used by the majority, 3 ' the dissent
reached different conclusions.' 3 2 The dissenters answered the preliminary
questions'33 in the same way as the majority, agreeing that the tests were
34
attributable to government action and implicated the fourth amendment.
The dissenters then considered the question of whether the search was
based on a valid warrant or recognized exception to the warrant requirement.' 35 They concluded that while the need to expeditiously collect
the samples might override the warrant requirement, there was no reason
a warrant could not be obtained after sample collection but prior to
testing of the sample. Because samples do not quickly degrade if properly
36
stored, there was no longer an immediate danger of losing evidence.
The dissent's final consideration was related to the requirement that
the search be based on probable cause or lesser particularized suspicion
if the search was characterized as minimally intrusive. 37 The dissenters
concluded that the searches in question involved neither probable cause
nor any degree of individualized suspicion.' 3 Further, the dissenters characterized the tests as very intrusive, quoting the majority's own characterization of urination as highly personal and private. 39 The dissenters
concluded that the only way the majority reached a different conclusion

128. Id.
129. Id.

130. Id.
131. Justice Marshall outlinedthe inquiry traditionally made in fourth amendment cases prior to
the advent of the "special needs" analysis as follows:
1. Has a fourth amendment search taken place?
2. Was the search based on a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement?
3. Was the search based on probable cause or validly based on lesser suspicion
because it was minimally intrusive?
4. Was the search conducted in a reasonable manner?
Id. at 641-42.
132. Id. at 642-43.
133. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.

134. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id.at 642-43.
137. Id.at 643.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 647 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th
Cir. 1987)).
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was by falsely classifying as minimal the privacy and dignity interests
4
involved and by inflating the efficacy of the FRA's testing program. '
In conclusion, the dissent stated that, based on the factors considered
above, the drug tests in question in Skinner should be allowed only on
a showing of probable cause.' 4' The dissent termed the special needs
consideration relied upon by the majority as "a manipulable balancing
inquiry,' 42 "unprincipled and dangerous,"'' 43 and a serious threat to the
right to be let alone.'"
The dissent raises another interesting concern by pointing out that the
Agency's regulations do not prohibit using the results of their testing
program for criminal prosecution. 45 Justice Marshall quotes the portion
of the regulation that states "each sample ... may be made available
to ... a party in litigation upon service of appropriate compulsory
process on the custodian of the sample . . . ."'4 The majority observes
that evidence of criminal behavior uncovered during an otherwise valid
regulatory search is not excludable unless the search is shown to be a
pretext for obtaining evidence for a criminal trial. '47 However, the Court
leaves "for another day the question whether routine use in criminal
prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme
would give rise to an inference of pretext."1' This makes it conceivable
that a covered employee could be prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
proceeding based solely on the results of a warrantless, suspicionless
search.149
III.

THE VON RAAB CASE

A.

Background
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, decided the same
day as Skinner, involved a similar attempt by the United States Customs
Service ("Service"), a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, to
require urine testing of employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain
positions. 150 This testing was required without any individualized suspicion
and would merely qualify an individual for a requested transfer or
promotion.' William Von Raab, the Commissioner of Customs, justified
the new testing requirements by stating that drug interdiction had become

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
489
Id.

at
at
at
at

650.
648.
640.
641.

at 650.
at 650-51 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1987)).
at 652 n.10 (citing ante at 621 n.5).
at 621 n.5.
at 651.
U.S. 656, 659 (1989).
at 660.
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the primary mission of the Service."12 Von Raab opined that the Service
is largely drug free, but "no segment of our society is immune from
the threat of illegal drug use."" ' He stressed that there can be no5 4tolerance
of those within the Service who use or possess illegal drugs.'
The Testing Program
The drug tests in question are a condition of placement or employment
for positions meeting any of the following criteria. The test is required
when an employee has "direct involvement in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws."' 55 Similarly, an employee seeking to move
56
into a position which requires that he carry a firearm must be tested.
Finally, an employee seeking a position57 in which he is required to handle
"classified" material must be tested.'
The tests are scheduled after an employee qualifies for a position
covered by the Service testing program. An independent contractor con58
tacts the employee to schedule a time and place for collecting the sample.'
The employee may produce the sample behind a screen or in the privacy
of a bathroom stall with only aural monitoring. 5 9 No information regarding medications currently being taken by the employee is collected
unless the specimen tests positive.lw0 Employees who test positive and
explanation for the result are subject to
cannot present a satisfactory
6
dismissal from the Service.' '
One significant way in which this program differs from that in Skinner
is that under the Treasury regulation, the "[tiest results may not ...
be turned over to any other agency, including criminal prosecutors, without
the employee's written consent.''1 This appears to eliminate one objection
the dissent in Skinner had to the drug testing program involved in that
B.

case. 163
ProceduralHistory
The National Treasury Employees Union ("Union"), a union of federal
employees, sued the Service in the United States District Court for the
C.

Eastern District of Louisiana seeking to enjoin the proposed new testing
requirements. The Union alleged that the "drug-testing program violated,
inter alia, the Fourth Amendment" by requiring Service employees to

submit to an unreasonable search in order to qualify for certain jobs
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661-62 n.1.
Id. at 663.
Id.
See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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within the Service. The district court agreed with the Union and granted
the injunction sought by the Union. 1"
The Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction. 65 While agreeing with the
lower court that the testing program was a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, the Fifth Circuit found the tests to be reasonable. 1 The court noted the Service's attempt to minimize the intrusiveness of the search by not requiring visual observation and by affording
the employee prior notice.' 67 The Fifth Circuit also found it significant
that there was very limited discretion under the guidelines in determining
which employees to test and that the tests were an aspect of the employment relationship.16
The court found that the government has a strong interest in ensuring
the integrity of Service employees in the affected positions. The court
concluded that "considering the nature and responsibilities of the jobs
for which the applicants were being considered," requiring
the drug test
69
as a condition of employment was not unreasonable.'
The dissenting judge in the fifth circuit based his opinion on the
rationale that the program, as formulated, could not meet the Service's
stated goals for two reasons. First, the tests would not detect drug use
because the five day advance notice given employees prior to testing
made the program ineffective. Second, "persons already employed in
sensitive positions [were] not subject to the test[ing].170
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari l l and affirmed
the portions of the Fifth Circuit decision which upheld the testing of
employees directly involved in drug interdiction or required to carry
firearms. 72 However, the Supreme Court vacated the portion of the Fifth
Circuit decision pertaining to the testing of applicants for positions
requiring the handling of classified materials.'7
D.

The Court's Analysis

1. Preliminary Questions
The Court considered the same preliminary questions addressed in
Skinner. 74 Here, as in Skinner, the Court determined that the drug tests
in question constitute searches which implicate the fourth amendment. 17

164. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 663-64.
168. Id. at 664.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 485 U.S. 903 (1988).
172. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 (1989).
173. Id. at 664-65.
174. The preliminary questions are: (1) are the tests in question attributable to the government
or its agents; and (2) do the tests amount to searches or seizures? See supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
175. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
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Therefore, the Service's drug testing program
must meet the reasonableness
76
requirement of the fourth amendment.
The Court reiterated the general preference that all searches be supported
by a warrant and probable cause. 177 It also cited its holding in Skinner,
which requires a balancing of the individual's privacy expectations against
the government's interests when determining whether it is impractical to
require a warrant or individualized suspicion in any particular case 78involving special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement.
2.

The Majority's Treatment of the Case
The Court examined the facts in Von Raab and concluded that the
Service's drug testing program was not designed to meet the ordinary
needs of law enforcement; its purpose was not to identify drug users for
prosecution. 7 9 The Court found the purposes of the program to be
deterring drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions
within the 80 Service and preventing the promotion of drug users to those
positions.'
a. The Warrant Requirement
The Court decided no warrant was needed in conjunction with the
testing program.' 8 ' It cited past decisions permitting warrantless searches
under a variety of circumstances. 81 2 The Court also focused on the
importance of the Service's mission and the possibility of compromising
that mission if every "routine, yet sensitive, employment decision" required a warrant. 183 Finally, as in Skinner, the Court found that in the
present context involving no discretionary determination to search, there
are no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.1'8 Therefore, a
warrant requirement would provide no additional protection for the covered employee. 18
b. The Probable Cause Requirement
As in Skinner, the Court stated that even when it is reasonable to
dispense with the warrant requirement, a search must still ordinarily be
based upon probable cause. However, this traditional standard "is peculiarly related to criminal investigations" 86and may not be helpful in
analyzing routine administrative functions.'

176. Id.

177. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
Id.at 666.
Id.
Id. at 666-67.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 667-68 (citations omitted).
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Criminal law enforcement is typically directed toward hostile or aggressive conduct, which most often occurs in public places and leaves a
trail of discernable facts."8 7 The traditional probable cause test functions
quite well under such circumstances. However, administrative searches,
such as housing inspections, involve conditions not detectable from outside
the premises and seldom provide probable cause that could serve as the
basis for a warrant. In other words, while the warrant and probable
cause requirement functions reasonably well in the criminal setting, it is
unworkable in many administrative settings.' This is particularly true
when a program is preventive in nature. 8 9 Events rarely lead to any
articulable grounds for searching any particular place or person.'9°
In evaluating the government's specific need to conduct the searches
in question, the Court considered the success of drug smugglers in bringing
drugs into the United States.' 9' Additionally, the Court found that many
of the Service's employees are regularly exposed to this criminal element
and the drugs in which they traffic. Employees are subjected to threats
and are tempted by bribes and by their own access to contraband seized
by the Service. 92 Therefore, the Court concluded that "the Government
has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel
are physically fit, and ...
[possess] unimpeachable integrity and judg93
ment.'"
The Court applied the balancing test from Skinner and held that "the
Government's need to conduct the suspicionless searches required by the
Customs program outweighs the privacy interests of employees engaged
directly in drug interdiction, and of those who otherwise are required to
carry firearms.' " 94 The Court reasoned that the public interest requires
that the employees charged with preventing drugs from entering this
country themselves be drug-free. 95 The national interest in preventing
drugs from coming into this country could be irreparably damaged by
agents unsympathetic to the mission of the Service or in collusion with
those attempting to subvert the law. Additionally, the Court stated that
the public should be spared the risk that employees impaired by drug
abuse will be promoted or transferred into positions requiring the use
of a firearm and the potential use of deadly force.'1
The Court then compared the interference with individual liberty caused
by these tests against the governmental interests just described. 197 The

187. W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 82, at 189.
188. Id. at 189-90
189. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
190. Id.
191. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-69 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 538 (1985)).
192. Id. at 669.
193. Id. at 670.
194. Id. at 668.
195. Id. at 670.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 671.
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Court began by noting that "operational realities of the workplace [often]
render entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors
and co-workers that . . . [would] ordinarily be viewed as unreasonable
[under] other circumstances.' '1 98 Depending on the job, these intrusions
99
might even extend to searches of the person.' For example, employees
of the United States Mint can expect to be searched daily as they leave
the workplace, and military and intelligence personnel may be required
to provide extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness, probity, and phys2

ical fitness.

E

00

The Union argued against the drug testing program, stating that "it
is not based on a belief that testing will [uncover] any drug use by
covered employees. ' 20 1 The Government presented no evidence of a perceived drug problem within the Service 0 2 and previous testing had resulted
in very few positive results.203 The Union also claimed the program was
insufficiently productive to justify its intrusiveness because, with the
advance notice given, an employee can evade detection by abstinence or
specimen adulteration. 2°4
The majority's response to the Union's first contention was to draw
an analogy between the drug tests at issue in Von Raab and airport
searches. 2°5 In airports, searches are conducted of all boarding passengers
in spite of the fact that very few are guilty of carrying any form of
weapon. In the case of airport searches, the risk of someone smuggling
a weapon or explosives on board an aircraft meets the test of reasonableness as long as the search is conducted in good faith and for the
26
purposes for which it has been approved. 0 The fact that the level of
intrusiveness involved is also much lower than in urine testing is not
mentioned by the majority. The Court again emphasized the unique and
important mission of the Service, the requirement that employees remain
drug free to reduce susceptibility to blackmail, and the extreme hazards
from promotion of drug
to safety and national security that could 20result
7
users to the positions covered by testing.

In response to the Union's second contention that the program, as
structured, is not effective enough to justify the intrusions on the employees' privacy, the Court stated that addicted employees will not be
20 8
able to abstain for even the five days for which they receive notice.
Additionally, the Court argued that the avoidance techniques suggested

198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 673.
202. Id.
203. There have been five positive tests out of approximately 3,600 administered. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 675-76 n.3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 674-75.
208. Id. at 676.
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by the petitioners are uncertain and "not likely to be known or available
to the employee." 2 °
c. The Holding
The Court held that the Government demonstrated "compelling interests
in safeguarding our borders and the public safety [which] outweigh the
privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to [the]
positions" covered by the testing program. 210 The majority therefore
concluded that the testing of employees seeking positions involving the
interdiction of drugs, the enforcement of related laws, or the carrying
of a firearm is reasonable under the fourth amendment. 21 ' However, the
Court did not extend its holding to Service employees with access to
"classified" information, as the Government had requested. 212 Instead,
the Court stated that the definition of what constitutes "classified"
information was not sufficiently clear from the record to permit a decision
regarding the need for the testing program. 21 3 The portion of the Fifth
Circuit decision addressing the testing of employees with access to classified
information was vacated and the issue was remanded for further proceedings. 2 4 The Court left open the possibility of including this category
215
of employee at a later date.
E.

The Dissent

1. Justices Marshall and Brennan
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a dissent very similar
to the one he wrote in Skinner.2 1 6 As in that case, his argument was
based on a perception that the Court's holding abandoned the fourth
amendment's protections against unreasonable searches. Justice Marshall
argued that the fourth amendment requires probable cause to justify a
search of the person. He also stated his agreement with the rationale
expressed in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.2 17
2. Justices Scalia and Stevens
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. 218 Both Justices Scalia and Stevens concurred in Skinner based
upon "the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted
class of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such use

209.
210.
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214.
215.
216.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 677.
at 677-78.
at 678.
at 679.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
at 679-80.
at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The evidence of drug and alcohol abuse pre-

the
sented in Skinner and its connection to railway accidents rendered
220 However,
society.
protecting
of
means
reasonable
a
search in that case
no direct evidence of an identifiable problem involving drug abuse in
the Service was presented in the Von Raab case. The government's failure
in
to provide any such evidence in Von Raab was cited by the Justices 22
dissent. 1
their
for
reason
the
as
and
Skinner
from
case
this
distinguishing
depends
In fourth amendment law, the question of reasonableness
2 2 For instance,
search.
the
prompts
that
necessity
social
largely upon the
in upholding an administrative search of a student's purse at school, the
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. relied upon the serious problem of
maintaining order in schools in an atmosphere of drug use and violent
crime. 223 In upholding fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border with
the authority to stop and search cars for illegal aliens, the Court in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerterelied on Immigration and Naturalization
Service information that as many as ten or twelve million aliens may
224
currently be in the country illegally. Furthermore, the drug and alcohol
tests upheld in Skinner were based upon a showing of a long-standing
industry. 225
and wide-spread problem with substance abuse in the railroad
The dissent then argued that the majority's opinion in Von Raab
contained no evidence of a problem which can be solved by urine testing
Service employees. 2 6 For instance, no evidence was presented to show
that a Service employee who uses drugs is any more vulnerable to bribes
than one who does not. 22 7 Nor was any evidence presented showing that
drug testing will be effective in preventing Service agents who carry guns
from risking impaired perception and judgment due to drug abuse. At
present, agents are aware that if they risk drug impairment, they can be
killed in combat with unimpaired drug smugglers. The dissenters did not
believe that the fear of detection through a pre-announced drug test
would have more of an inhibiting effect on possible drug use than the
228
dangers inherent in the job already provide. Justice Scalia stated that
the majority's argument lacked any proof that the dangers cited as the
basis for the compelling governmental interest actually occur. Although
the Court pointed out that several employees had been removed for taking
bribes and other integrity violations, and that at least nine officers had

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 680-81.
222. Id. at 681.
223. The problems of maintaining order in the schools, drug use, and violence were documented
in an agency report to Congress. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
224. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551-552 (1976)).
225. The problem was documented in a study and in a review of accident records. Id. (citing
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606-08 (1989)).
226. Id.
227. Id.at 682.
228. Id. at 683.
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,died in the line of duty since 1974, there was no indication that any of
these instances were related to drug use by Service employees. 229
The dissent's argument pointed out that in numerous previous decisions,
the Court had taken pains to establish the existence of a special need
for the search based upon well-known or well-demonstrated evils clearly
linked to the problem at hand with well-known or well-demonstrated
consequences. 2 0 According to Justice Scalia, the majority in Von Raab
abandoned that principled search for a legitimate special need. Instead,
the majority justified the testing program based upon the existence of
a pervasive social problem-drug abuse-combined with speculation as
to the effect of that problem on people employed by the Service. 23'
IV.

THE SEARCH FOR A PRINCIPLED DISTINCTION
Skinner and Von Raab extend the boundaries of a proper fourth
amendment search. Both decisions allow warrantless searches of the person
without requiring the probable cause or particularized suspicion previously
required for this type of search. 2 2 The cases do not set a new outer
limit or provide any guidance other than the "special needs" criteria and
the balancing test from Camara.233
The dissenting opinions in each case attempt to provide a principled
basis for establishing a new outer limit for the protections of the fourth
amendment.2 14 Justices Marshall and Brennan would require at least some
indication of particularized suspicion for a search of the person, with a
strong preference for a full showing of probable cause. 235
Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish between Skinner and Von Raab
presents an approach for delineating a new outer boundary for limiting
intrusive government searches. 23 6 In Skinner and other previous cases, the
Court always had specific information establishing a specific problem or
problems to which the search in question was advanced as a solution. 23 7
In Von Raab, no evidence of a specific problem was advanced. 238 Instead,
the Court relied upon general statements about the societal problem of
drug abuse to justify the testing program. 23 9
Justice Scalia was not willing to take that extra step and eliminate the
requirement of a specific, documented problem that could be solved or
improved by implementation of the drug testing program in question. 240
His separate opinion made it clear that he considered the decision le-

229.
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236.
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240.

Id.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 684.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 639-40.
Id.
See supra notes 132-49, 216-31 and accomlanying text.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 636; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679-80.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81.
Id. at 681.
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Id. at 682.
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gitimizing the tests as unsupported by the evidence. At a minimum,
Justice Scalia would require credible evidence of a specific problem and
a logical connection between the evil perceived and the solution proposed. 24
In Skinner, there was ample evidence of a serious rail safety problem
caused by drug or alcohol impaired employees. 242 There was documentary
evidence of deaths and property damage caused by the problem. 243 The
testing of employees involved in certain accidents or safety violations is
2
a logical solution to at least some aspects of the overall problem. "
However, Von Raab does not present the same situation. 24 For Justice
Scalia, this omission of evidence of a specific problem at which to direct
the testing provides the point for drawing the line in2 deciding how far
to expand traditional fourth amendment protections. 46
While Justice Scalia's attempt to provide a principled basis for deciding
future fourth amendment cases has the virtue of narrowing the broad
scope presented in the Court's opinions in Skinner and Von Raab, it
too suffers from considerable subjectivity. Left open for future decisions
are the issues of how serious the problem sought to be corrected must
be in order to trigger the special needs analysis, how much evidence of
a problem within the field is enough, what sources of such evidence are
acceptable, and the appropriate standard to use in judging the fit between
24 7
the problem and the questioned procedure advanced as a solution.
However, while not perfect, the principles provided by Justice Scalia's
separate opinion are a step in the direction of narrowing the overly broad
principles of the Court's majority opinion under which virtually any
24
search or seizure can be justified as meeting special governmental needs. 1
V.

LATER CASES

A.

Federal Cases
A number of cases have been decided by various federal courts since
Skinner and Von Raab. In Harmon v. Thornburgh,249 the court considered
a challenge to random drug testing 250 of some employees 2 ' of the De-

241. Id. at 683.
242. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
243. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
244. Id. at 608.
245. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681-82.
246. Id. at 682-83.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990).
250. Id. at 485. The court found the random aspect of the testing program in question here to
be simply one more factor to be weighed in the balancing test used to evaluate the program in
question. Id. at 489.
251. The drug testing plan called for the random testing of employees in five categories: (1)
employees with top secret clearance; (2) employees involved with grand jury proceedings; (3) employees
serving under Presidential appointments; (4) employees assigned to prosecute criminal cases; and (5)
employees involved with the storing or safeguarding of drugs. Id. at 486.
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partment of Justice. 2 2 The court applied the balancing test from Skinner
and Von Raab,211 holding that the governmental interest in safeguarding
classified information was the only claim made by the government worthy
of serious consideration. 2 4 Therefore, the testing program was upheld
255
only for those employees with a top secret national security clearance.
Harmon is noteworthy for its extension of the principles announced in
Skinner and Von Raab to a situation in which there was no significant
public safety interest. The court upheld the testing program by considering
the government's interest in protecting classified information .256
In National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney,217 the court
upheld a drug testing program for many categories of civilian employees 258
of the Department of Defense directly related to safety and drug abuse
reduction considerations. However, the court rejected the plan for
employees 25 9 working in job categories where the need to test was less
clear.

26

0

American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner261 upheld
a drug testing program, which included random urinalysis, for Department
of Transportation employees in a wide variety of jobs. 262 Because most
of the employees involved in the suit were vehicle operators, this was
the job classification most strongly challenged by the Union. 263 The court
upheld testing for those employees driving shuttle buses and other passenger vehicles on the basis of the safety rationale. 264 The court differentiated drivers of vehicles such as mail vans, however, and it also
approved the random testing of their operators based upon their handling
2 65
of classified information.
B.

State Cases
The response of state courts to the decisions in Skinner and Von Raab
266
has, for the most part, been similar to that of the federal courts.

252. Id.
253. Id. at 488.
254. Id. at 490.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990).
258. Id. at 608. The drug testing was upheld for civilian employees who service aircraft, fly
aircraft, and those who serve as police officers and guards. Id. at 610.
259. The court disapproved the random drug testing plan for a wide variety of job classifications,
including positions working with chemical and nuclear materials. The disapproval was based on the
inclusion of much less dangerous jobs, such as secretarial and animal caretaker positions, in the
same category. Id. at 611-12.
260. Id.
261. 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990).
262. Workers whose jobs directly involved safety, law enforcement, and national security were
subject to the random, suspicionless drug testing program. Id. at 887.
263. Id. at 891.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 893.
266. The majority of state court decisions have followed the general pattern of ruling the tests
constitutional and upholding them when special need can be demonstrated. See, e.g., Chiles Offshore,
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However, courts in both California and New York have, on some oc26
casions, relied on state constitutions to protect the rights of individuals.
While the number of cases following this approach are few, it may suggest

a possible rationale under which state courts can preserve a greater measure
of individual rights than the level currently possible in the federal courts.
For instance, the New Mexico Supreme Court has recently demonstrated
its willingness to rely on the state constitution to afford greater protection

to its citizens. In State v. Cordova,26 the court decided to continue to

use the Aguilar-Spinelli test 269 as the basis for the standard to be followed
270
by magistrates in issuing search warrants based on hearsay information.
The court opted for Aguilar-Spinelli, the more stringent test, relying on

the New Mexico Constitution and court rules, 271 rather than following

the federal courts in adopting the Illinois v. Gates test. 272 If New Mexico
and other jurisdictions look to their state constitutions, the erosion of

traditional fourth amendment rights resulting from the decisions in Skinner
and Von Raab may be minimized.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since the decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, courts have upheld
274

random testing in a variety of cases,

273

while rejecting it in others.

Inc., v. Administrator, Dept. of Employment Sec., 551 So.2d 849 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding
employer's use of random drug screening urinalysis test); Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 537 N.E.2d
1230 (1989) (upholding random urinalysis for probationary fire fighter); City of Annapolis v. United
Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (Ct. App. 1989) (no violation of
fourth amendment to randomly drug test city police officers and fire fighters); In re Carberry, 114
N.J. 574, 556 A.2d 314 (1989) (random drug testing of state troopers not unconstitutional); Seelig
v. Koehler, 151 A.D.2d 53, 546 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1989) (plan requiring random drug testing of all
New York City correction officers was not constitutionally infirm); McKenzie v. Jackson, 152 A.D.2d
1, 547 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1989) (upholding random urinalysis for correction officers); Independent School
Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa County v. Logan, 789 P.2d 636 (Ok. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding random
drug tests for school bus drivers); Singleton v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 558 A.2d 574 (Pa. 1989) (upholding transit authority's inclusion of drug screening as
part of reinstatement physical).
267. For instance, in Doe v. Roe, Inc., 143 Misc. 2d 156, 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1989),
the court found that denial of employment to plaintiff on the basis of a positive drug test violated
his rights under the state's Human Rights Law. In Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.
App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989), Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 266
Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1990), and Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267
Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990), California courts looked to the state constitution to define the
rights of individuals objecting to random drug testing. In the first case, Wilkinson, the court found
that a private employer's conditioning of employment upon successfully passing a drug screening
test did not violate the state's constitution. In Semore, the court held that the right of privacy in
the California Constitution in some circumstances protects individuals from the actions of private
employers as well as governmental agencies. In Luck, the court held that the right to avoid giving
a urine sample was a privacy interest protected by the state constitution.
268. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
269. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
270. 109 N.M. at 219, 784 P.2d at 38.
271. SuP. CT. RUt.as ANN. 5-211(E), 6-208(F), 7-208(E), 8-208(F) (Recomp. 1986); Cordova, 109
N.M. at 214 n.4, 784 P.2d at 33 n.4.
272. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
273. Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (correctional employees who came into
regular contact with prisoners or who had opportunities to smuggle drugs to prisoners); Thomson
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Courts appear to be taking a cautious approach to permitting random
drug testing, failing to uphold such programs in the absence of particularized suspicion of drug abuse against the group or class sought to be
tested. The following patterns-appear from the cases decided to date.
First, the courts have preferred governmental interests predicated on
concrete, issues, such as public safety or the protection of classifiedinformation, over more subjective interests, such as preserving workforce
integrity. Second, the courts have preferred narrowly drawn categories
of employees with specifically justified reasons for conducting drug testing
over broader categories and justifications. Third, some state courts have
looked to their state constitutions in affording greater protection to their
citizens than that provided by the United States Constitution under these
recent decisions.
While the decisions considered in this comment have reduced the
protections traditionally available under the fourth amendment, the relatively cautious approach to implementation taken by the lower courts

v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (civilian employees in Army chemical weapons plant);
Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 884 F.2d 709 (2nd
Cir. 1989) (mass transit workers covered by the Railway Labor Act); Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d
1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bus attendant involved in transporting handicapped children); Transportation
Institute v. Burnley, 727 F. Supp. 648 (D.D.C. 1989) (pre-employment testing, license application
or renewal testing, and post-casualty testing in event of a serious accident for private employees
aboard commercial ships); Moxley v. Regional Transit Serv., 722 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
(regional transit authority's testing of drivers); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos,
721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989) (Department of Education motor vehicle operators); Brown v.
City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (city police officers).
274. The courts rejected government arguments for random urinalysis in the following cases:
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Skinner, 894 F.2d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Urban Mass Transportation
Administration lacked statutory authority to impose uniform national solution to local problem by
prophylactic rule making); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (drug testing was not
upheld for all prison employees in general, only for those who came into regular contact with
prisoners or had opportunity to smuggle drugs to prisoners); Beattie v. City of St. Petersburg Beach,
733 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (fire fighters, in the absence of current evidence of problems
caused by drug use); National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 733 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C.
1989) (plant protection and quarantine officers, computer specialists, and motor vehicle operators
of the Department of Agriculture); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. School Dist., 730 F.
Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (high school students in grades
7-12 engaged in extra-curricular activities); Transportation Inst. v. Burnley, 727 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C.
1989) (while upholding pre-employment testing, license application or renewal testing, and postcasualty
testing, the court did not uphold random testing of almost all employees aboard commercial vessels);
American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989) (postal workers not
highly regulated and have no history of drug-related safety problems); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1989) (motor vehicle operators and computer or
communications specialists or assistants); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F.
Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989) (while upholding the testing of motor vehicle operators, the court refused
to permit random testing of automatic data processors who did not have access to truly sensitive
information); Dimeo v. Griffin, 721 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 924 F.2d 664 (7th Cir.
1991) (horse racing employees, including outriders, parade marshals, starters, assistant starters,
drivers, and jockeys); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Thornburgh, 720 F. Supp. 154 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (all employees of Federal Bureau of Prisons, regardless of job function); American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Austin, 712 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1989) (drug testing of civilian employees
of federal government not based on generalized suspicion that special circumstances existed which
warranted the testing).
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is encouraging. The actual shape of the new contours of the fourth
amendment will become clearer in the months and years to come.
HENRICK A. ROEHNERT

